Biblioteca Especializada
La Biblioteca del Banco Central del Uruguay se fundó en 1967, integrándose con una colección de libros proveniente del Banco de la República, que se ha ido incrementando a través de los años, hasta llegar en el momento actual a 7.700 volúmenes aproximadamente, 200 títulos de publicaciones periódicas, bases de datos en CD Rom, publicaciones de organismos nacionales e internacionales y publicaciones producidas por el Banco Central.
La Biblioteca está especializada en Economía, poniendo el énfasis en monetaria, finanzas, estadística, econometría y teoría económica. Además, apoya al Banco Central en sus funciones y está abierta a investigadores externos a la Institución, profesionales y estudiantes de Economía y Finanzas.
Modern Monetary Policy and Central Banking Governance
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Contenido :
Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic
Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility Versus Flexibility
The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness
Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission
The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective
Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing
Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice
A Comparison of Some Basic Monetary Policy Regimes for Open Economies: Implications of Different Degrees of Instrument Adjustment and Wage Persistence
Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability
Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers
Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence
Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence
Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence
Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision be Separated?
Central Bank Independence and Accountability: Theory and Evidence
Communication, Transparency, Accountability: Monetary Policy in the Twenty-First Century
How Transparent are Central Banks?
A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information
Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking
Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic
Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility Versus Flexibility
The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness
Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission
The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective
Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing
Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice
A Comparison of Some Basic Monetary Policy Regimes for Open Economies: Implications of Different Degrees of Instrument Adjustment and Wage Persistence
Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability
Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers
Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence
Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence
Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence
Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision be Separated?
Central Bank Independence and Accountability: Theory and Evidence
Communication, Transparency, Accountability: Monetary Policy in the Twenty-First Century
How Transparent are Central Banks?
A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information
Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking
Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
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| Código de barras | Signatura | Tipo de medio | Ubicación | Sección | Estado |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 37670 | 332.112 EIJm | Libro | Biblioteca Especializada | Colección general | Disponible |
