Biblioteca Especializada
La Biblioteca del Banco Central del Uruguay se fundó en 1967, integrándose con una colección de libros proveniente del Banco de la República, que se ha ido incrementando a través de los años, hasta llegar en el momento actual a 7.700 volúmenes aproximadamente, 200 títulos de publicaciones periódicas, bases de datos en CD Rom, publicaciones de organismos nacionales e internacionales y publicaciones producidas por el Banco Central.
La Biblioteca está especializada en Economía, poniendo el énfasis en monetaria, finanzas, estadística, econometría y teoría económica. Además, apoya al Banco Central en sus funciones y está abierta a investigadores externos a la Institución, profesionales y estudiantes de Economía y Finanzas.
Recent Developments in Monetary Policy
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Contenido :
Rules Rather than Discretion : The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
The Advantage of Tying One's Hands : EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility
Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics
Target Zones and Realignments
How Independent Should a Central Bank Be?
Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control
Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers
Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts
Inflation Targeting : A New Framework for Monetary Policy?
Inside the Black Box : The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission
Credit Cycles
Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy
Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations : A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis
Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice
Monetary Policy Rules in Practice . Some International Evidence
Forward-Looking rules for Monetary Policy
What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules
Targeting versus Instrument Rules for Monetary Policy
Rules Rather than Discretion : The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
The Advantage of Tying One's Hands : EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility
Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics
Target Zones and Realignments
How Independent Should a Central Bank Be?
Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control
Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers
Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts
Inflation Targeting : A New Framework for Monetary Policy?
Inside the Black Box : The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission
Credit Cycles
Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy
Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations : A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis
Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice
Monetary Policy Rules in Practice . Some International Evidence
Forward-Looking rules for Monetary Policy
What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules
Targeting versus Instrument Rules for Monetary Policy
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| Código de barras | Signatura | Tipo de medio | Ubicación | Sección | Estado |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 37478 | 332.46 CHRr v.1 | Libro | Biblioteca Especializada | Colección general | Disponible |
