Biblioteca Especializada
La Biblioteca del Banco Central del Uruguay se fundó en 1967, integrándose con una colección de libros proveniente del Banco de la República, que se ha ido incrementando a través de los años, hasta llegar en el momento actual a 7.700 volúmenes aproximadamente, 200 títulos de publicaciones periódicas, bases de datos en CD Rom, publicaciones de organismos nacionales e internacionales y publicaciones producidas por el Banco Central.
La Biblioteca está especializada en Economía, poniendo el énfasis en monetaria, finanzas, estadística, econometría y teoría económica. Además, apoya al Banco Central en sus funciones y está abierta a investigadores externos a la Institución, profesionales y estudiantes de Economía y Finanzas.
Monetary and fiscal policy. Credibility
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Contenido :
Rules rather than discretion : the inconsistency of optimal plans
Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation, and the benevolent dissembling government
On the time consistency of optimal policy in a monetary economy
Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information
Sustainable plans
Social contracts as assets : a possible solution to the time-consistency problem
Sovereign debt : is to forgive to forget?
The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target
The advantage of tying one's hands : EMS discipline and central bank credibility
The European Central Bank : reshaping monetary politics in Europe
Designing institutions for monetary stability
Constitutions and commitment : the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England
Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital
Time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy
Why do we have nominal government debt?
On the flexibility of monetary policy : the case of the optimal inflation tax
Servicing the public debt : the role of expectations
Rules rather than discretion : the inconsistency of optimal plans
Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation, and the benevolent dissembling government
On the time consistency of optimal policy in a monetary economy
Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information
Sustainable plans
Social contracts as assets : a possible solution to the time-consistency problem
Sovereign debt : is to forgive to forget?
The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target
The advantage of tying one's hands : EMS discipline and central bank credibility
The European Central Bank : reshaping monetary politics in Europe
Designing institutions for monetary stability
Constitutions and commitment : the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England
Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital
Time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy
Why do we have nominal government debt?
On the flexibility of monetary policy : the case of the optimal inflation tax
Servicing the public debt : the role of expectations
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| Código de barras | Signatura | Tipo de medio | Ubicación | Sección | Estado |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 37207 | 332.46 PERm | Libro | Biblioteca Especializada | Colección general | Disponible |
