Biblioteca Especializada
La Biblioteca del Banco Central del Uruguay se fundó en 1967, integrándose con una colección de libros proveniente del Banco de la República, que se ha ido incrementando a través de los años, hasta llegar en el momento actual a 7.700 volúmenes aproximadamente, 200 títulos de publicaciones periódicas, bases de datos en CD Rom, publicaciones de organismos nacionales e internacionales y publicaciones producidas por el Banco Central.
La Biblioteca está especializada en Economía, poniendo el énfasis en monetaria, finanzas, estadística, econometría y teoría económica. Además, apoya al Banco Central en sus funciones y está abierta a investigadores externos a la Institución, profesionales y estudiantes de Economía y Finanzas.
The Theory of Corporate Finance, v.1
|
Contenido :
Competition and Unanimity
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
Competition and Unanimity Revisited
Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information
Information, managerial Choice and Stockholder Unanimity
Efficient signalling with Dividends and Investments
Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information
Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Determinants of Corporate Borrowing
Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets
Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies
Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms have Informations that Investors do not have
Risk, Managerial Effort, and Project Choice
Why New Issues are Underpriced
Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades
Preplay Communication, Participation Restrictions, and Efficiency in Initial Public Offerings
Insiders and Outsiders : The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt
Seniority and Maturity of Debt Contracts
Competition and Unanimity
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
Competition and Unanimity Revisited
Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information
Information, managerial Choice and Stockholder Unanimity
Efficient signalling with Dividends and Investments
Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information
Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Determinants of Corporate Borrowing
Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets
Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies
Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms have Informations that Investors do not have
Risk, Managerial Effort, and Project Choice
Why New Issues are Underpriced
Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades
Preplay Communication, Participation Restrictions, and Efficiency in Initial Public Offerings
Insiders and Outsiders : The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt
Seniority and Maturity of Debt Contracts
Reserva
Reservar este documentoEjemplares(1)
| Código de barras | Signatura | Tipo de medio | Ubicación | Sección | Estado |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 34997 | 332.1 BREt | Libro | Biblioteca Especializada | Colección general | Disponible |
